The Politics of Morality (3): From Morality of Intentions and Morality of Purposes to Morality of Means

A theoretical introduction to a new ethics, which breaks free from the paradoxes characterizing the contemporary political discourse. Morality in our time has gone bankrupt and become a negative factor in decision-making - and therefore immoral. Hence, there is a need for a different paradigm, which sees learning as the moral act - particularly empirical-scientific learning, as parallel to the Halachic morality of Torah study. Even today, this thinking can serve as a negative guide: to identify destructive moralistic forms of thought, and to cleanse morality from the harmful religious metaphysics that has spread through it - especially in its seemingly secular form

The Middle Way: Treat everything as a means and not as an end (Source)

The morality of intentions leads to countless internal failures (Hitler and Communism also had good intentions - only the means were hell), while the morality of goals often suffers from emptiness and circularity of its definitions, or their excessive rigidity. In fact, moral theories can be roughly characterized according to the three fundamental times behind them, which correspond to the classic legal division of intention, purpose, and means. There are theories that judge an action according to what precedes it - before it. For example: Kantian morality of intentions, or theories emphasizing will - like Schopenhauer and Buddhism, or the heart - as in Christianity, or Platonic moral knowledge, or virtues. All these come before the action and as causes of it. In contrast, there are theories that judge the morality of an action according to what comes after it, such as utilitarianism, morality of goals, Aristotelian purpose, pragmatism, Machiavellianism, or various messianic ideologies that subjugate every action to them, especially economic ones (socialism and capitalism). But today, there is an urgent need to strengthen a third type of moral paradigm: the morality of means.

"Morality of means" is a kind of philosophy of morality that argues that the morality of an action is measured by the means, and only the means determine whether the action is good or bad - and it is far from the common moral thinking of our time. Known means theories are conservatism, Taoism, and the middle way. In such thinking, the path and method are important, while intentions and goals are trivial, if they exist at all (because in this type of thinking, there can also be action determined only by means, without goals or intentions, like aesthetic and artistic action). Empirical morality of means is a moral theory in which the question of intentions and goals is perceived as trivial and circular - to do good - and is not seen as a criterion for moral distinction (Hitler wanted to do good!). In contrast, the question of means is the critical question, and it will, for example, distinguish between capitalism and communism. If the means is proven - the action is moral, and if it is proven wrong or not proven - the action is not moral. And if there is no proven means - then one must act according to a proven method, and this will be the moral and good action, while action according to a method proven to be wrong or unproven - is evil.



The empirical approach is not empty - precisely because it is based on empirical experience. Empirically, the scientific method is the most successful and proven method in human history (more than industrial capitalism, which is younger than it, and has known quite a few crises and collapses). Therefore, in order to do good, for example to add health, wealth and happiness, culture and wisdom (the question of intentions is perceived as childish. Who doesn't want to do good? And if such a psychopath exists - no morality will stop him), one must act according to proven means. The question of intentions and goals is perceived as a kind of ideological distraction, which has always hindered moral thinking and left it stuck at its starting point (which is the opening or closing point of the moral act). Instead of the starting and ending points - we should deal with the middle.

A moral argument presupposes the sharing of intentions and goals, and it is an argument about means, or more precisely an empirical proof struggle (like in science!) that these or other means are effective. In this paradigm, there is no meaning to unproven gut feelings, and action without a solid experimental basis - in the scientific sense - is an immoral action, unjustified - and evil. In case such an experiment does not exist, and immediate action is required, one should act in the form of scientific experimentation, that is, according to a proven method. And in case the scientific method doesn't help, one should act according to the most proven method possible, for example: learning algorithm, evolutionary learning, conservatism, wisdom of the crowds, or even capitalism and democracy (two very bad methods - except for all the other methods tried on such a scale).

If we imagine a future where it will be possible to prove mathematically, or even computationally - for example through computer simulation - what is the right means, then the most moral act would be to act according to the mathematical or computational method, not the scientific one. In fact, if artificial intelligence becomes a more proven method than our own intelligence - then the good would be to listen to its advice, and the evil would be to ignore its advice. Just like in the period when man faced a situation where God claimed to understand better than him what was good for him, and therefore one should listen to his advice. In other words, empirical morality of means is a historicist theory, and what was moral and correct in it in the past is not necessarily so in the present - and this is from its very nature as an empirical theory, in which evidence accumulates. In 1000 BCE there was no evidence for the effectiveness and correctness of the scientific method, while today, even in the religious world it is not acceptable to claim proof for the correctness of religion - but belief in it.

Deontology, by the way, contrary to its pretension, is not a morality of means in the above sense, just as Halacha is not. One who sees the act itself as having moral significance is not interested in it as a means, but turns it itself into a goal, or a starting point. The morality of means always looks at the act as a way and a method, that is, not in itself. Kant himself is a complicated case in this sense, because his thought contains several different moral definitions (which he of course claims to be identical), each falling into a different category in the triple taxonomy above. In any case, if we look historically and empirically at moral failures, we find that only rarely do they stem from bad intentions or bad goals, and these are the cases that are easiest to identify as immoral and avoid. The vast majority of failures in human action - on any scale, historical or personal - stem from choosing incorrect means.



A moral theory that wants to be relevant to the actual actions of human beings must concentrate 99% of its power on the question of how to find correct and proven means, and what are the methods for this, and leave the remaining 1% for philosophical discussion on abstract definitions of goals and motives. Today, the situation is reversed in moral thinking, and therefore it is always trapped in pointing out injustice and criticism, and in a victim competition between different injustices (i.e. different moral goals. Some will cry out the pain of the disabled, and some will protest - yes, with a 'ch' - the pain of women, etc., and some will support all, because it's the most moral and easy). Alternatively, it is trapped in the morality of intentions, that is, in an attempt to educate, to construct discourse, and other directions whose problem is that they are not effective means, and sometimes achieve the opposite of their goal. And what does moral discussion deal with in the most amateurish way? In choosing correct ways and methods.

From now on, say: Not only does the end not justify the means, but it secularizes them. It subjects them to empirical examination. The moral thinking of the source of morality, which comes before the act, led to the idea of God's command, and the thinking of the purpose that comes after the act led to the idea of reward and punishment in the afterlife and messianism. The persistence of these structures in secular morality leads to the dominance and popularity of the morality of intentions and the morality of purposes, and it's time to break free from them. Even the choice and prioritization between different (or even contradictory) moral goals should not be resolved at the level of intentions and goals, but at the level of means, for example in finding means in which the principled contradiction is not actually realized (for example a bypass or cleverness or creative means in a third direction), or alternatively in preference arising from the means themselves. For example, if there are currently effective means to help women and not blacks, then we should help women and not blacks right now, without having to consider whether women are more important than blacks. After all, there may be highly moral goals, for example eternal life, and we are not acting towards them because the means have not yet matured. If anything, the available, proven and effective means - are what sanctify the goals.



In means-oriented morality (MOM), research and experimentation and examination of means have supreme moral value, including scientific research - as the frontier of morality. This frontier establishes moral means - and produces the moral act, which is a result of the means, and not of the intention or purpose. For example, if there is a consensus in the research community in economics regarding certain means - then they should be implemented before turning to less proven means, and the frontier of moral research is reaching questions where there is insufficient knowledge about the correct means, and in which one should progress through experiments. Action in complex systems without experimentation, and based on gut feelings and intuitions or theories based on "crowd logic", in which politicians specialize, is an immoral action. The common moral failure of our time is the failure of ideological justification instead of empirical justification.

If we require Kantian extremism, what determines the moral criterion is not the specific success rate of the act and its results, nor the intention behind it, but the correctness of the method. One whose action result is good by chance or luck, like one who saved a person by mistake - did not do a moral act. One who intended good but acted based on his personal opinion and arrogance while ignoring empirical knowledge about the results, like one who gave charity in its naive form instead of its effective form - did an immoral act. On the other hand, one who acted according to a proven method and empirical knowledge and the result was bad - did a moral act, and the next moral act required of him will be research to improve the method, based on the new feedback - that is, it is a learning morality.

This solves the moral paradox of paving the road to hell. The good intentions that lead to hell - are evil. The failure of good intentions, the central human moral failure of our time, which replaces hubris in modern history - receives root treatment in a morality where the way and method are more important than the beautification of intentions and the pompousness of goals. The boasting of values and ideals, the hypocrisy involved in it, and the competition for moral capital - all these are sick trends that grow from intention-oriented morality - as opposed to competition for effective means. The problem with political correctness is that it is an empty and ineffective means of energy investment, compared to much more proven alternatives, and therefore it is not moral.

In means-oriented morality there are far fewer nudniks, self-appointed educators, and Facebook preachers - and many more data analysts, scientists, economists, social science researchers, statisticians, and graphs. The substantive discussion - is always an empirical discussion. The most moral occupation in the world is not being a social worker or social activist or even a philanthropist but a researcher and scientist. Therefore, morality is not orthogonal to intelligence, as we have been accustomed to believe. And this is the thing that monkeys least want to hear, because it most hurts their moral pride - to be a person of high moral standing you don't need your "heart to be in the right place", or to be righteous, but you must be, as a prerequisite, smart. The ideal of "moral exemplar" is closely related to the ideal of "wise" and "wisdom". And this is already very ancient wisdom - and truly subversive.